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AMERICAN VERTIGO: “DUAL USE,” PRISON PHYSICIANS, RESEARCH, 
AND GUANTÁNAMO 
George J. Annas, JD, MPH 
Physicians can be used by governments for nonmedical purposes, 
and physician acceptance of their nonmedical use is usually denoted as 
―dual loyalty,‖ although it is more analytically helpful to frame it ―dual 
use.‖ Dual use of physicians has been on display at Guantánamo where 
physicians have consistently been used to break hunger strikes as part of the 
military security mission in ways that directly violate medical ethics. Guan-
tánamo itself has also been seen worldwide as a uniquely horrible prison, 
which can tell us little about other American prisons. The contrary seems to 
be true:  Guantánamo, and the use and misuse of physicians there, is much 
more a reflection of the American prison system that an aberration of it.  
Closing or reforming Guantánamo will not solve the problem of the dual 
use of physicians in American prisons and the American military.  As illu-
strated by a report of an expert Institute of Medicine committee on research 
in American prisons, the entire U.S. prison system will have to be reformed 
to adequately address the problem of dual use of physicians in prisons. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The concept of ―divided loyalties‖ is an inherently perverse one, 
suggesting that loyalty is negotiable and never trustworthy. This is how 
many Americans felt about the Japanese-Americans in World War II, and is 
why Japanese were confined in concentration camps, even though there was 
  
   William Fairfield Warren Distinguished Professor and Chair, Department of Health 
Law, Bioethics & Human Rights, Boston University School of Public Health, School of 
Medicine, and School of Law, 715 Albany Street Boston, Massachusetts, 02118.  
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no evidence that they were disloyal to the United States.1 The terms ―di-
vided loyalty‖ and ―dual loyalty‖ were used as a rationalization for taking 
action against them. Something similar is going on when this term is dep-
loyed to describe physicians in the United States military: that they have 
divided or dual loyalties because they face inherent conflicts between their 
obligations as physicians and their obligations as military officers. My own 
view is that this is simply false; the entire rationale for having a military 
medical service is to provide the best medical care possible to the U.S. mili-
tary—and that such care can only be provided if soldiers trust military phy-
sicians to follow medical ethics without exception.2 
Military commanders in charge of prisons do, however, attempt to 
use military physicians for nonmedical, security purposes. In this regard, it 
is more analytically useful to think about this as a case of ―dual use,‖ in the 
same sense that medically beneficial products and processes can also be 
used as weapons to harm people. Physicians, both military and civilian, can 
also make ―dual use‖ of people when practicing medicine: treating them for 
their medical condition, and thus as a patient, but also using them as re-
search subjects to test a hypothesis. It is also possible that military physi-
cians could find themselves confronted by both types of dual use; for exam-
ple, ordered to experiment on their patient-prisoners by their superiors. 
Thus, it makes sense when reviewing attempts to make dual use of military 
physicians in prisons that we simultaneously look at the dual use of prison-
ers—as patients and research subjects—that some physicians propose them-
selves.3 
The primary places where dual use of military physicians has oc-
curred is in the post 9/11 prisons at Bagram Air Force Base, Abu Ghraib, 
and Guantánamo.4 The first two have been renamed—in an unrealistic at-
tempt to rehabilitate them.5 Guantánamo, however, seems likely to stay 
  
 1 Ilan Zvi Baron, The Problem of Dual Loyalty, 41 CANADIAN J POLITICAL SCI 1025, 1033 
(2009). 
 2 George J. Annas, Military Medical Ethics: Physician First, Last, Always, 359 NEW 
ENGLAND J. MED. 1089–90 (2008). 
 3 Cf. GEORGE J. ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS, 68–69 (2010). 
 4 See, e.g., Workshop Summary, Institute of Medicine, Military Medical Ethics: Issues 
Regarding Dual Loyalties, ix (Sep. 8, 2008), available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php 
?record_id=12478. 
 5 See, e.g., Michael Phillips, U.S. Seeks Friends in Afghan Detainees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
5–6, 2011, A11 (―The U.S. military is trying to turn its detention system in Afghanistan, long 
a public relations disaster, into an asset in its campaign to win over the public.‖) and Farah 
Stockman, Kinder Prison, Swifter Justice for US Detainees in Afghanistan, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 
18, 2011, A6. This strategy is, however, unlikely to succeed given past history and the large 
number of prisoners held in other Afghanistan prisons that are effectively run by the Taliban. 
Ernesto Londono, Insurgents Find Support Among Fellow Prisoners, BOS. GLOBE, March 13, 
2011, A15. 
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open and functioning with its original name indefinitely.6 The role of mili-
tary physicians there is doubly complicated by the fact, recognized by the 
U.S. Department of Defense, that the continued force feeding of competent 
hunger strikers at Guantánamo is a direct violation of medical ethics as arti-
culated by the World Medical Association (WMA) and the American Medi-
cal Association.7 This situation (officially requiring military physicians to 
ignore medical ethics precepts) is unique in American military history, and 
one that I have written about before.8 In this Article, I will say more about 
hunger strikes at Guantánamo, but I will also examine another duality, refut-
ing the claim that military prison at Guantánamo, and the dual use of physi-
cians there, is so unique that it should be seen as an aberration in the Ameri-
can justice system, rather than as a mirror image of the worst aspects of U.S. 
mainland prisons. The way wardens, physicians, expert commentators, and 
the courts have justified nonmedical and coercive acts by physicians is bi-
zarre enough to cause vertigo, and this helps explain my title for this Ar-
ticle. And because the anti-prisoner actions seem to me to be entirely con-
sistent with America’s view of the dangerousness of its large prison popula-
tion, ―American vertigo‖ seems appropriate as well.  
American Vertigo is also the title French philosopher and journalist, 
Bernard-Henri Levy, gave to his observations of America that he made after 
retracing the footsteps of Tocqueville.9 Like a leading U.S. expert group 
that championed doing more medical research on prisoners—the Institute of 
Medicine’s (IOM) Committee of Prisoner Research (Committee)10—Levy 
began his journey in 2005. This was four years after 9/11 and the com-
  
 6 Scott Shane & Mark Landler, Obama, in Reversal, Clears Way for Guantanamo Trials 
to Resume, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2011, A19; Hendrik Hertzberg, Prisoners, NEW YORKER, 
Apr. 18, 2011, 45–46. 
 7 ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS, supra note 3 at 64. See also, Media Roundtable with 
Assistant Secretary Winkenwerder, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (June 7, 2006), http://www. 
defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=33. 
 8 ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS, supra note 3, at 59–74. 
 9 BERNARD-HENRI LEVY, AMERICAN VERTIGO: TRAVELING AMERICA IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF 
TOCQUEVILLE (Charlotte Mandell, trans., 2006). 
 10 The Committee’s formal name is longer, ―Committee on Ethical Considerations for 
Revisions to DHHS Regulations for Protection of Prisoners Involved in Research.‖ Project 
Information, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, http://www8.nationalacademies.org/cp/projectview. 
aspx?key=HSPX-H-04-06-A (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). I choose human experimentation to 
compare with force-feeding of hunger strikers because medical experimenters have also been 
charged with having dual loyalties---even leading dual lives: 
Contemporary medical researchers often lead double lives in pursuit of their re-
search goals . . . Like the knights of old, their quest for the good, whether progress 
in general or a cure for AIDS or cancer specifically, can lead to the destruction of 
those human values such as dignity and liberty that we hold central to civilization. 
George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self-Deception in Postmodern 
Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH LAW POLICY 297, 298 (1996). 
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mencement of our ―global war on terror,‖ and three years after Guantánamo 
was opened. The centerpiece of this war has been to capture would-be ter-
rorists and interrogate them in our greatly expanded global prison system, 
especially, as previously noted, in Afghanistan, where the most infamous 
was Bagram Air Force Base; in Iraq, which featured Abu Ghraib; and in 
Cuba, which features Guantánamo. At all of these prisons, the Central Intel-
ligence Agency and the American military have inflicted tortuous acts and 
cruel and degrading treatment on prisoners.11 At home, the U.S. prison pop-
ulation continues to grow, and the United States has set a new world-record 
in terms of the percentage of the civilian population in prison.12 
In March 2011, President Barack Obama, reversing his promise and 
position that he would close the prison in Guantánamo Bay, decided instead 
to reinitiate military trials there and keep the prison open indefinitely.13 The 
reason the President originally pledged to close Guantánamo was his belief 
that it was a uniquely horrible prison, ―quite simply a mess, a misguided 
experiment.‖14 He is not the only one to refer to Guantánamo as an experi-
mental prison. A Senate investigation found that commanders at the prison 
often referred to it as ―American’s Battle Lab‖ where untested methods of 
interrogation, which were ―to some degree experimental,‖ were tried out.15 I 
have also previously suggested that the use of ―restraint chairs‖ by the med-
ical staff at the prison to break the 2005–06 mass hunger strike there could 
also be seen as experimental, since they had never before been used for this 
purpose .16 In this Article, I will use this ―experimental‖ designation to ex-
plore the question of whether the President was right initially to see Guan-
tánamo as an aberration of American justice and the American prison sys-
  
 11 ANNAS, WORST CASE BIOETHICS supra note 3, 41–57 and sources cited therein. See also 
Broken Laws, Broken Lives: Medical Evidence of Torture by US Personnel and its Impact, 
PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://brokenlives.info/?page_id=69 (2008), and U.N. Hu-
man Rights Council, Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the 
Context of Counering Terrorism, Feb. 19, 2010, available at http://www2.ohchr.org/English 
/bodres/hrcouncil/doc/13session/A-HRC-13-42.pdf. 
 12 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, US Prison Population Nears 1.6 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/world/americas/23iht-23prison.12253738.html; 
and N.C. Aizenman, New High In U.S. Prison Numbers, WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2008, Al; 
Lisa Moore & Amy Elkavich, Who‘s Using and Who‘s Doing Time: Incarceration, the War 
on Drugs, and Public Health, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 782 (2008). 
 13 Exec. Order 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
pkg/FR-2011-03-10/pdf/2011-5728.pdf. 
 14 ANNAS, supra note 3, at 69; see also PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXPERIMENTS IN 
TORTURE: EVIDENCE OF HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION IN THE 
―ENHANCED‖ INTERROGATION PROGRAM 3 (2010) (equating torture monitoring to experimen-
tation by linking water-boarding, pain infliction and sleep deprivation to research designed to 
elicit information during interrogations). 
 15 ANNAS, supra note 3, at 69. 
 16 Id. at 60. 
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tem, or whether Guantánamo is more properly seen as a logical extension of 
the American prison system, as Levy maintained, and as President Obama 
now seems to accept as well. I will approach this question by examining in 
some depth an IOM report on human experimentation in American prisons 
issued during the Bush administration, with a view to  determine how Guan-
tánamo ―fits‖ into the landscape of American prisons,  American justice, 
and American research.  
II.  THE IOM PRISON RESEARCH COMMITTEE 
The IOM Committee described its charge: ―to examine whether the 
conclusions reached by the national commission [National Commission for 
the Protection of Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research] in 1976 
remain appropriate today.‖17 There was no identification of any major prob-
lems with prison research in the United States that would have provided a 
framework for the committee’s work.18 Instead, the structure was to consid-
er changes in prisons and medical research that might lead to a reconsidera-
tion of existing rules, and to suggest an approach that would permit more 
research on prisoners. To oversimplify somewhat, the committee’s report 
follows a syllogism:  
1. Research is beneficial.  
2. Prisoners should have access to that which is beneficial.  
3. Therefore prisoners should have (more) access to research. 
A parallel syllogism seems to have been applied at Guantánamo in response 
to the hunger strikes: 
1. Hunger striking risks the prisoner’s life. 
2. Physicians should prevent prisoners from risking their lives. 
3. Therefore, physicians should prevent prison hunger strikes. 
Both syllogisms have problems. The primary one with the first syllogism is 
that it conflates research with treatment (usually woefully inadequate in 
  
 17 COMM. ON ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR REVS. TO DHHS REGS. FOR PROTECTION OF 
PRISONERS INVOLVED IN RES., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS 24 (Nat’l Acads. Press, 2007). 
 18 Although the IOM Committee itself found prison research acceptable, critics disagreed. 
See, e.g., Bernice S. Elger, Research Involving Prisoners: Consensus and Controversies in 
International and European Regulations, 22 BIOETHICS 224–38 (2008) (proposing an ―equi-
valence of care‖ system to address the lack of voluntary consent by prisoners to be research 
subjects); see also Osagie Obasogie, Prisoners as Human Subjects: A Closer Look at the 
Institute of Medicine‘s Recommendations to Loosen Current Restrictions on Using Prisoners 
in Scientific Research, 82 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 41 (2010) (thoughtfully critiquing the IOM 
Committee’s approach). 
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prisons), thereby making a dual use seem like a single use. The same is true 
of the second syllogism, where force-feeding hunger strikers is equated with 
medical treatment. But there are others: prisoners are not granted all the 
benefits of free living people, and prisoners are uniquely situated in ways 
that compromise their autonomy and make voluntary consent especially 
problematic.  
But even this syllogism structure is grossly oversimplified, as the 
IOM report itself provides support for almost every position one might have 
to either promote or restrict research on prisoners. Most often, the goal is 
stated as expanding research on prisoners, but at other times the stated goal 
is to protect prisoners from exploitation.19 Sometimes informed consent is 
seen as too important in current regulations and replaceable, other times it is 
seen as central and nonnegotiable.20 Sometimes prisons are seen as the new 
mental health institutions; other times the as-yet-un-adopted regulations on 
research on the mentally disabled are viewed as irrelevant in the prison set-
ting.21 Children are excluded from the analysis, but the children’s research 
regulations are sometimes viewed as a model for changing the prisoner reg-
ulations.22 No specific language is ever suggested as to how the current 
prisoner regulations might be modified.  
How did the Committee adopt such a confused and internally in-
consistent report? My own view is that by so abstracting the issue of re-
search on prisoners from the questions of how they became prisoners, why 
we have more prisoners per capita than any country in the world, why Afri-
can Americans and Hispanics are so overrepresented in prisons, and what 
the impact of the global war on terror is on our view of prisoners and their 
rights, the entire exercise became so disconnected from the real world that it 
could produce no useful public policy recommendations. As will be ad-
dressed later, similar observations apply to breaking the hunger strikes at 
Guantánamo.   
The definition of prisoner is the central issue in any discussion of 
research on prisoners. The Committee knows this, but nonetheless insists on 
expanding the definition of ―prisoner‖ from the current one that includes 
those ―involuntarily confined or detained in a penal institution‖ to include 
an additional five million non-prisoners (unconfined people on probation 
and parole).23 This begs the question of why we should have separate rules 
for prisoners at all (if not because their involuntary confinement makes vo-
luntary consent extremely unlikely), and why we should not just include all 
  
 19 See IOM Committee, supra note 10, at 4, 115. 
 20 See id. at 4, 147. 
 21 See id. at 44, 57. 
 22 See id. at 3 n.1, 79. 
 23 See id. at 102–03. 
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potential research subjects under the term ―prisoner?‖ This is the central 
conceptual problem with the IOM’s report.  
Two more concrete operational problems undermine the report’s 
credibility. The first is that while expanding the definition of prisoner radi-
cally, the report simultaneously contracts it by excluding from consideration 
not only children and involuntarily confined mental patients, but also pris-
oners held under the U.S.A. Patriot Act.24 The report did not specifically 
exclude Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, but  nonetheless fails to even men-
tion these two American prisons.25 The second concrete problem with the 
report is its internal incoherence. There are, for example, only two chapters 
devoted to ―ethics,‖ and these often read as if they were written by two sep-
arate committees (or study directors) that had fundamental disagreements. 
The report really does induce vertigo. Each of the two major operational 
flaws merits discussion.  
III.  AMERICAN PRISONS AT HOME AND ABROAD 
Writing a report about research on prisoners without acknowledging 
the increasing role of prisons and mistreatment of prisoners can only paint a 
partial picture. By far the most famous prison in the world is Guantánamo 
Bay, and the most infamous prison in the world is  Abu Ghraib. This was 
also true when the Committee was working on their report.  
How is it possible that an IOM committee on the ethics of prison re-
search could proceed as if these prisons did not exist? It was, of course, 
Bush Administration doctrine that ―we do not torture,‖ that Abu Ghraib was 
the result of a few bad apples on the night shift, and that Guantánamo only 
holds the ―worst of the worst‖ and is necessary to prevent another 9/11.26 
But IOM study committees should proceed from science and data, not from 
the  political ideology of the administration in power. Nonetheless, these 
prisons were so central to the Bush Administration’s view of what is and is 
  
 24 Id. at 26 n.1. 
 25 The committee itself seems to have been conflicted on this topic, as indicated by a foot-
note that appears twice in the report: ―The committee decided to exclude children (unless 
treated as adults), military personnel, persons under restricted liberty due to mental illness, 
and persons outside the criminal justice system, such as those detained by the U.S. Patriot 
Act [sic].‖ IOM Committee, supra note 10, at 3 n.1, 26 n.1. Although this language does not 
specifically exclude Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib or any other prison outside the U.S., the 
committee likely made a conscious decision not to mention them. Neither of these prisons 
appear anywhere in its report, even in footnotes. 
 26 Richard Benedetto, Bush Defends Interrogation Practices: ―We Do Not Torture‖, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 7, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-11-07-
bush-terror-suspects_x.htm; see also Phillip Carter, The Road to Abu Ghraib, WASHINGTON 
MONTHLY, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411 
.carter.html; Katty Kay, No Fast Track at Guantanamo Bay, BBC NEWS, Jan. 11, 2003, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2648547.stm. 
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not acceptable to do to prisoners (both under domestic and international 
law) that it would be unthinkable to prepare a report on U.S. research on 
prisoners without at least mentioning, if not analyzing, them.27  
The Committee’s chairman, Professor Lawrence Gostin, seems to 
agree with this assessment. In a summary of the report for the readers of the 
Journal of the American Medical Association, written in the wake of criti-
cisms of the report, he wrote that ―[t]he IOM report recounted the painful 
history of medical mistreatment in the Tuskegee syphilis trials and Holmes-
berg prison, as well as prisoner abuse at Guantánamo Bay and Abu 
Ghraib.‖28 I do not believe that Professor Gostin meant to intentionally mi-
srepresent his Committee’s report to an audience of physicians unlikely to 
ever read the report itself. Rather, I think he was simply reflecting his view 
that the report would have no legitimacy if it did not include reflection on 
these prisons; therefore, it must have included them—even though it did 
not. But there is a logical and reasonable rationale  for either not treating 
Guantánamo at all or treating it as an afterthought: the IOM Committee 
members really did see Guantánamo as nothing special or different from 
other U.S. prisons, and thus did not see it as necessary to make  any specific 
comments on it.  
Gostin also mentions Nuremberg, Holmesberg prison, and Tuske-
gee. The latter, of course, did not involve research on prisoners, but on free-
living African Americans. It is nonetheless relevant because of its racism, 
which is mirrored in the  American prison population, which is dispropor-
tionately comprised of African American males found guilty of drug-related 
crimes.29 Racial disparities in medicine are now widely condemned, but 
grossly disproportionate racial distributions in prisons seem well accepted. 
The IOM report reflects this view. The Committee recognizes the incredibly 
disproportionate numbers of African Americans and Hispanics in our pris-
ons, but the report never addresses the issue or makes any suggestions of 
why it might matter, even concerning  virtually all-African American pris-
ons like Holmesberg.30 
  
 27 See, e.g., Elie Wiesel, Without Conscience, 352 NEW ENGL J. MED. 1511, 1511–13 
(2005). 
 28 Lawrence O. Gostin, Biomedical Research Involving Prisoners: Ethical Values and 
Regulation, 297 JAMA 737, 739 (2007). 
 29 See ANNAS, supra note 3. 
 30 A. M. HORNBLUM, ACRES OF SKIN: HUMAN EXPERIMENTS AT HOLMESBURG PRISON 
(Routledge, 1998). See also M. HORNBLUM, SENTENCED TO SCIENCE: ONE BLACK MAN’S 
STORY OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA (U. Pennsylvania U. Press 2007). In an epilogue to this 
book he criticizes the IOM report, arguing that it is ahistorical:  
More than forty years of intimate involvement in prisons—both here and abroad—
has taught us [Hornblum and the subject of his book, Edward ―Yusef‖ Anthony] 
that true prison reform, in whatever manifestation, is either illusory, ephemeral, or 
so watered down that it is merely a charade orchestrated by those in power. The 
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IV.  THE NUREMBERG CODE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Using Tuskegee as a cipher to represent racial injustice without ac-
tually dealing with the problem of race may have made it seem reasonable 
to use Nuremberg as a cipher as well and to ignore its meaning. The Com-
mittee writes simply  that ―[t[he commission’s [National Commission] deli-
berations took place against a background that included the Nazi experi-
ments with concentration camp prisoners followed by the adoption of a 
stringent standard of voluntary consent in the Nuremberg Code.‖ 31 There is 
no discussion of what research was actually conducted by Nazi physicians 
in the concentration camps, of the prosecution of these physicians by Amer-
ican prosecutors to a court composed of American judges, or of the rationale 
for the Nuremberg Code and its direct application to the American military, 
American prisoners, and American researchers. Instead, the Committee 
seems to view the Nuremberg Doctors’ Trial and its resultant Nuremberg 
Code as an historical anomaly rather than as the foundational ethical and 
legal text for the worldwide regulation of all experimentation on humans.32 
Because the Bush Administration was trying to marginalize related 
international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions and the Convention 
against Torture, it may have seemed reasonable to the IOM Committee to 
simply adopt the Bush administration’s dismissal of international humanita-
rian and human rights laws.  Gostin, suggests this explanation in writing 
about his own change of philosophy regarding human rights and civil liber-
ties. In accepting an invitation to rewrite public health laws to give public 
health officials more power over Americans after 9/11, Gostin writes: ―I had 
no desire to work for the Bush Administration, but when I was informed 
that if I did not accept, the White House planned to draft the law internally, 
I reluctantly accepted, after seeking whatever assurances I could of non-
interference.‖33 
  
history of imprisonment in American is one of good intentions gone awry, bad 
practices solidified, and hope all but extinguished. 
Id. at 197; See also, Amnesty Int’l, United States of America: Rights for All, AI Index AMR 
51/35/9 (1998), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR51/035/1998/en/ 
0440cd04-da99-11dd-80bc-797022e51902/amr510351998en.pdf (detailing the conditions of 
U.S. prisons). 
 31 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at 114. 
 32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171, (entered into force March 23, 1976). This also permitted the committee to ignore the 
international law documents that followed, especially the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which, among other provisions, states clearly, in article 7 that ―[n]o one 
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In 
particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experi-
mentation.‖ (emphasis added). 
 33 Lawrence O. Gostin, From a Civil Libertarian to a Sanitarian, 34 J. LAW & SOCIETY 
594, 614–615 (2007). 
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My point here is not whether the Chairman is right or wrong, or 
even whether he (or the Committee) is credible as a spokesperson for the 
imprisoned poor. Rather, it is that the report is consistent with Gostin’s 
stated philosophy: accept, even advocate, infringing on individual rights (for 
example, voluntary consent) as long as your intentions (for instance, to im-
prove health status through beneficial research) are good. Dual use of pris-
oners under this rationale is not only permissible, it is desirable. This seems 
to be precisely the ethic that is at work in Guantánamo that permits physi-
cians to rationalize force-feeding competent hunger strikers in restraint 
chairs: dual use of military physicians is justified, even required, to prevent 
prisoners from ―harming themselves.‖  
V.   GUANTÁNAMO HUNGER STRIKES AND EXPERIMENTATION 
Even if the IOM Committee wanted to avoid any criticism of the 
Bush Administration’s anti-human rights prison policies, it should have at 
least examined the military’s suppression of a mass hunger strike at Guan-
tánamo in early 2005. The U.S. military adopted a novel strategy of using a 
―restraint chair‖ to break a mass hunger strike by placing hunger strikers in 
eight point restraints and then forcing a nasogastric tube up their nose and 
down their esophagus.34 This basic technique had been labeled torture by 
the President’s Bioethics Council—albeit when done to prisoners in the 
Soviet Union using a straightjacket instead of a restraint chair.35 But even if 
not considered torture, it seems correct to me to label it as a form of human 
experimentation since this ―medical device‖ (the restraint chair) had never 
been used for the purpose of breaking a mass hunger strike before, and the 
U.S. military was ―studying‖ it to see if it was safe and effective.36  
  
 34 See Letter from The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) The International Federa-
tion for Human Rights (FIDH) The European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights 
(ECCHR) Appeal for Justice National Litigation Project, Allard K. Lowenstein International 
Human Rights Clinic, Yale Law School (NLP) to Mr. Manfred Nowak, United Nations Spe-
cial Rapporteur,  
Mr. Anand Grover, United Nations Special Rapporteur, and Martin Scheinin, United Nations 
Special Rapporteur (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Formal%20 
Communication%20Craddock%20April%202,%202009.pdf. 
 35 See George J. Annas, The Legacy of the Nuremberg Doctors‘ Trial to American Bioeth-
ics and Human Rights, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 19 (2009).  
 36 ANNAS, supra note 3. Even if one rejects the notion of a medical experiment in this 
context, the military’s primary justification for using the restraint chairs—that they are fol-
lowing a protocol used by the federal Bureau of Prisons—would seem to make the subject of 
off-shore prisons especially relevant for the Committee’s study, i.e. in asking the question 
regarding which rules should apply to medical treatment and research in these prisons. See 
also Vincent Iacopino, Scott Allen & Allen Keller, Bad Science Used to Support Torture and 
Human Experimentation, 331 SCIENCE 34 (2011). 
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The argument that the procedures followed , whether research or 
discipline, at Guantánamo are irrelevant to what goes on in U.S. mainland 
prisons is not persuasive. Levy, who visited six American prisons in the 
footsteps of Tocqueville, again helps give us   perspective. Reflecting on his 
visit to Guantánamo near the end of his U.S. journey, he writes: 
You can argue about whether or not Guantanamo should be closed . . . . 
What you cannot possibly say is that Guantanamo is a UFO, fallen from 
some unknown, obscure disaster. What you are bound to recognize is that 
it is a miniature, a condensation, of the entire American prison system.
37
 
Levy seems correct. One could go even further and argue that the 
―supermax‖ prisons in the United States violate basic international human 
rights. This argument is currently being made to the European Court of 
Human Rights—but, of course, international human rights apply in U.S. 
prisons only insofar as they are consistent with the U.S. Constitution and the 
Eighth Amendment.38 Nonetheless, it should be of great interest that almost 
simultaneously with the large Guantánamo 2005 hunger strike, there was a 
coordinated hunger strike at the federal supermax prison in Florence, Colo-
rado by the convicted al-Qaeda terrorists being held there.39 Because almost 
no information ever gets out of supermax prisons, we know virtually noth-
ing about this hunger strike, except that unlike Guantánamo it was ―success-
ful‖ in that the convicted terrorists were transferred from high security de-
tention.40  
The newest Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Sonia Soto-
mayor, can be viewed as the Justice most concerned with prisoners’ rights. 
In 2010, there were only seven occasions in which any Justice wrote a dis-
  
 37 Levy, supra note 9, at 227 (emphasis added).  
 38 Jean Casella and James Ridgeway, U.S. Supermax Prisons are Challenged in the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights—and Lose the First Round, SOLITARYWATCH, July 8, 2010. See 
also Atul Gawande, Hellhole:  The United States hold tens of thousands of inmates in long-
term solitary confinement. Is this torture?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009. 
 39 Joby Warrick and Peter Finn, ‗06 Memo cites Food Strike by Detainees, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 28, 2009, at A03. 
 40 Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, for John A. Rizzo, 
Acting General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency Re: Application of the Detainee 
Treatment Act to Conditions of Confinement at Central Intelligence Agency Detention Facil-
ities, 13 n.11 (Aug. 31, 2006) (―Together, the terrorists orchestrated the beginning of their 
hunger strike and developed a sophisticated method to resist compulsory feeding. Ultimately, 
due to this coordination, the [al-Qaeda] terrorists succeeded in gaining transfer from high 
security detention.‖). The U.S. Bureau of Prisons is also in the process of formalizing the 
institutionalization of ―mini-Guantanamos‖ in federal prisons, Dept of Justice, Proposed 
Rule:  Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17324 (Apr. 6, 2010), and Alia 
Malek, Gitmo in the Heartland:  Inside the secret, mostly Muslim prisons that ban virtually 
all contact with the outside world, THE NATION, Mar. 28, 2011, 17–20 (discussing prototypes 
established at Marion, Illinois and Terre Haute, Inidana federal prisons). 
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sent to the Court’s refusal to hear a case and she wrote three of them—more 
than any other Justice—and all were about the rights of criminal defendants 
or prisoners.41 The most important one involved a Louisiana prisoner, An-
thony C. Pitre, an AIDS patient, who stopped taking his antiretroviral medi-
cation to protest his transfer to another prison.42 In response, prison officials 
assigned him to perform hard labor in one-hundred degree heat—labor that 
caused him to collapse and require emergency treatment.43 The prison phy-
sician, nevertheless, approved the hard labor punishment as a reasonable 
way to get him to change his mind and go back to taking his medications.44 
A lower court also approved of the punishment, saying that the prisoner 
could stop it at any time by taking his medications voluntarily.45 In Soto-
mayor’s view, the Court should have at least heard his appeal because, as 
she saw it,  
Pitre’sdecision to refuse medication may have been foolish and caused a 
significant part of his pain. But that decision does not give prison official 
license to exacerbate Pitre’s condition further as a means of punishing or 
coercing him—just as a prisoner’s disruptive conduct does not permit 
prison officials to punish the prisoner by handcuffing him to a hitching 
post.
46
 
Of course, a completely analogous punishment is ongoing at Guan-
tánamo, where prisoners are force-fed in restraint chairs as punishment for 
refusing to eat, and the rationale can also be that they can stop this punish-
ment at any time by their own action of starting to eat again. It is also of 
note that military officials at Guantánamo and in the Pentagon have also 
rationalized their force-feeding behavior by saying that the Standard Operat-
ing Procedure in hunger strikes is based on the U.S. Bureau of Prisoner 
hunger strike regulations.47 While I have in the past argued that this was not 
accurate—given that in the U.S. prison all decisions about force-feeding are 
to be made solely by the prison physician on the basis of the prisoner’s 
health needs, and the prisoner has been tried, convicted of a crime, and sen-
  
 41 Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Guides Court‘s Liberal Wing, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010, at 
A10. See the following cases for a more in depth reading of the subject matter for which 
Justice Sotomayor wrote dissents as a result of the Court’s denial of certiorari. Gamache v. 
California, cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 591 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Pitre v. Cain, cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 8 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Williams v. Hobbs, cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 558 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 42 Pitre, 131 S. Ct. at 8. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 9. 
 45 Id. at 8. 
 46 Id. at 9. 
 47 28 C.F.R. § 549.60 (1994). 
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tenced, and continues to have access to an attorney—these are all differenc-
es without a distinction if the prison physician is willing to force-feed a 
competent prisoner.48 Unfortunately, as the case of William Coleman in 
Connecticut illustrates, this can be the case.49 It should nonetheless be un-
derlined that although the method of breaking hunger strikes by using re-
straint chairs has also been adopted in the U.S. prison system, there is no 
prison hunger strike on record anywhere in the world of the length (some-
times years) that some Guantánamo prisons have refused to eat.   
In addition, while not available to the IOM Committee, the treat-
ment of an American soldier in a U.S. mainland military prison confirms the 
similarities with Guantánamo. As is now well-known, the first set of classi-
fied Standard Operating Procedures at Guantánamo, including instructions 
on how to halt a hunger strike, were posted on the Internet by WikiLeaks in 
2007.50 WikiLeaks later became seen as a much more direct threat to Amer-
ican security when it posted a large batch of internal U.S. government doc-
uments in 2010.51 These documents were thought to have been provided to 
WikiLeaks by an active duty U.S. soldier, Private First Class (Pfc) Bradley 
E. Manning.52 Manning was arrested in May 2010 and has since been held 
in solitary confinement in a Marine Corps jail cell.53 He is said to be 
stripped naked every night, forced to stand at attention naked, and sleeps in 
a ―suicide-proof smock‖ under constant suicide-watch.54 The military psy-
chiatrist asked to determine whether or not Manning was suicidal or likely 
to hurt himself, originally determined that he was.55 But in January 2011, 
the psychiatrist withdrew his suicide-watch recommendation, saying Man-
  
 48 See ANNAS, supra note 8, 60–70. 
 49 Lantz v. Coleman, 978 A.2d 164 (Conn. 2008) (finding that the state can force-feed an 
inmate engaged in a hunger strike). 
 50 Julian Assange et al., Changes in Guantanamo Bay SOP Manual (2003–2004), 
WIKILEAKS (Dec. 3, 2007) http://mirror.wikileaks.info/wiki/Changes_in_Guantanamo_Bay_ 
SOP_manual_(2003-2004)/. 
 51 U.S. Says Wikileaks Could ―Threaten National Security‖, BBC (July 26, 2010),  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-10758578. See generally, DAVID LEIGH & LUKE 
HARDING, WIKILEAKS: INSIDE JULIAN ASSANGE’S WAR ON SECRECY 20–31 (Guardian Books 
2011). Wikileaks has continued to disclose ―secret‖ files on the Guantanamo inmates, most 
recently in April, 2011. Charlie Savage, William Glaberson & Andrew Lehren, The Guanta-
namo Files:  Details of Lives in an American Limbo, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1. 
 52 Glenn Greenwald, The Inhumane Conditions of Bradley Manning‘s Detention, 
SALON.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.salon.com/news/opinion/glenn_greenwald/2010/12/ 
14/manning. 
 53 Scott Shane, Obama Defends Detention Conditions for Soldier Accused in WikiLeaks 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/12/us/12 
manning.html?_r=2&adxnnl=1&ref=us&adxnnlx=1300897015CixgPKMtCgu5R15v+NJED
w. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
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ning was actually a ―low risk‖ prisoner.56 In this case, the military physician 
seems to have successfully resisted being used for security purposes. The 
case of Pfc. Manning is ongoing, and even President Obama had to com-
ment on it after the State Department’s top spokesperson, Philip J. Crowley, 
called Manning’s treatment ―ridiculous, counterproductive and stupid.‖57 
Obama’s unsatisfactory response could have been provided by  President 
George Bush. Obama said he asked the Pentagon whether the procedures 
being used to confine Manning ―are appropriate and are meeting our basic 
standards [and] [t]hey assure me that they are.‖58 Put another way, Guantá-
namo standards are consistent with U.S. ―basic standards.‖  And, of course, 
to the extent that President Obama adopts the approaches to the ―war on 
terror‖ first implemented by President George W. Bush, these approaches 
become official U.S. policy rather than a one-president aberration.  
VI.  INTERNAL INCONSISTENCIES 
Just as Americans and Supreme Court Justices (but not Presidents) 
are often of two minds in comparing Guantánamo to the U.S. prison system 
in general, the IOM was of two minds in applying the core doctrine of in-
formed consent to research on American prisoners (it obviously has had no 
application to the hunger strike response at Guantánamo, but is, of course, 
critical to the WMA’s hunger strike ethics policy). A central example is the 
IOM Committee’s view of the Nuremberg Code and the Code’s  insistence 
on informed consent. The American judges at Nuremberg did make in-
formed consent of prisoner research subjects their number one item in the 
Nuremberg Code, but that was not the end of it.59 The judges, looking for-
ward, also insisted that although informed consent is necessary, it is never 
  
 56 Id. 
 57 Id.; After making this statement, the spokesman resigned two days later. Jeffrey Young, 
State Department‘s Philip J. Crowley Resigns, Citing WikiLeaks Comments, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 14, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-13/state-department-
s-crowley-quits-citing-wikileaks-comments-1-.html. 
 58 Shane, supra note 53; Farah Stockman, State Dept. Spokesman Quits Over Remarks, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 14, 2011, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington 
/articles/2011/03/14/state_dept_spokesman_quits_over_remarks/; Obama has since faced 
Bradly Manning protestors, even at a very high end fundraiser in California. See Jackie 
Calmes & Brooks Barnes, Obama Makes His Case in Mostly Friendly Territory, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2011, at A15. Obama also accepted at face value a very shallow report on conditions 
at Guantanamo conducted shortly after he became president. See Len Rubenstein & George 
Annas, Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre and in the US Military: A Time 
for Reform, 374, 9686 LANCET 353 (2009).  
 59 National Institute of Health, Regulations and Ethical Guidelines, Nuremberg Code, 
http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). 
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sufficient—there are nine additional requirements for legal and ethical re-
search in the ten-point Nuremberg Code.60 
The Nuremberg Code insists that consent be ―voluntary, competent, 
informed and understanding.‖61 In the prison context, of course, the primary 
issue is voluntariness, as the Committee recognized.62 Nonetheless, instead 
of thinking hard about how consent might be judged to be voluntary in the 
prison context, the Committee spends almost an entire chapter in the report 
denigrating consent as a meaningful or useful protection against the exploi-
tation of human subjects.63 Paradoxically, in the next  and final chapter of 
the report, ―Systems of Oversight, Safeguards, and Protections,‖ the Com-
mittee sets forth  a ringing endorsement of the consent requirement of the 
Nuremberg Code:  
Recommendation 6.1. Ensure voluntary informed consent. Human re-
search participant protection programs should ensure voluntary informed 
consent is obtained from subjects in all research involving prisoners.
64
 
This recommendation, which is also consistent with the WMA’s 2006 posi-
tion on care for hunger striking prisoners, is directly on target. The Commit-
tee is to be merits commendation for its insights on informed consent, which 
are worth quoting at some length: 
 
Informed consent is vital to autonomous decision making and respect for 
persons and is considered a bedrock of ethical research—whether it in-
volves prisoners or non-prisoners. Informed consent is an interactive and 
ongoing process . . . . The written consent form—one part of the process—
is the mechanism for documenting that communication with the partici-
pants regarding relevant considerations to enrollment in a protocol has 
taken place. The informed consent process must help the prisoner to exer-
cise autonomous decision making. The process poses special challenges in 
the correctional setting, where autonomy may be inconsistent with institu-
  
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Specifically, the Committee makes the following arguments in Chapter 5. ETHICAL 
CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17. ―Recent scholarship has questioned the myopia caused by 
such a narrow focus [on informed consent]‖; ―There seems to be agreement from a variety of 
perspectives that informed consent forms have consumed too much time and energy‖; ―A 
more fundamental question is whether too much weight has been placed on informed con-
sent‖; ―These questions about undue focus on informed consent influence our recommenda-
tions‖ ; The ethical risks associated with research involving prisoners cannot be solved by 
focusing only on the informed consent document‖; and ― . . . the myopic emphasis on in-
formed consent . . . .‖ Id. at 117–122. These statements, which mainly conflate the doctrine 
of informed consent with an ―informed consent document‖ seem to be the prelude to jettison-
ing or at least marginalizing the role of informed consent in prison research. Id. 
 64 Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
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tional order and judicially imposed limitations on liberty . . . . There is no 
question that, within correctional settings, it is more difficult to provide in-
tegrity to the process of informed consent, but this does not remove the ob-
ligation. If it is determined that voluntary informed consent is not obtaina-
ble, then a research protocol should not go forward.
65
 
The centrality of prisoner autonomy to the doctor-patient relation-
ship is, of course, also the foundational rationale for the WMA’s insistence 
that prison physicians not force-feed competent hunger strikers. Only the 
informed consent of a competent prisoner can justify a physician to provide 
treatment (or engage in research), including ―physician-assisted‖ feeding. 
VII.  JUSTICE AND PRISON RESEARCH REGULATIONS 
There are other examples of inconsistencies in the IOM report that 
induce vertigo. The report begins by underlining in its preface that ―The 
charge of our Committee . . . was to explore whether the conclusions 
reached in 1976 by the National Commission . . . remain appropriate to-
day.‖66 Nonetheless, in the one-hundred and seventy-four pages that follow, 
virtually no attempt is made to address this charge. The 1976 report, for 
example, is never analyzed. My colleagues Leonard Glantz and Barbara 
Katz and I wrote the informed consent background paper for the National 
Commission’s prisoners report, which covered—in much more detail than 
  
 65 Id. at 147–48 (emphasis added). This paragraph is preceded by another that describes a 
visit by the IOM committee to ―one prison and one prison medical facility‖ at which, we are 
told, ―The prisoners actively expressed the desire to have access to research . . . [and] echoed 
the sentiment that prisoners possess sufficient autonomy to make informed decisions about 
whether to participate in a given study.‖ Id. at 122. This description is clarified further in a 
footnote: ―Of course, this survey only represents the views of a limited sample of prisoners.‖ 
Id. Of course, no valid conclusions can be drawn from these ―unstructured discussions.‖ This 
description matters because the IOM committee immediately follows it with a conclusion 
designed to marginalize the importance of consent: ―This, combined with the myopic empha-
sis on informed consent, is why the current categorical regulatory approach should be aban-
doned in favor of a risk-benefit paradigm.‖ Id. In this regard, it is worth noting, as the IOM 
committee did not, what followed from the parallel paragraph cited by the committee above, 
in the National Commission’s own report of their actual study of prisoners (a representative 
sample of eighty prisoners) at Jackson: 
Participants gave many reasons for volunteering for research, including better liv-
ing conditions, need for a good medical evaluation, and desire to perform a worth-
while service to others, but it was clear that the overriding motivation was the 
money they received for participating. In fact their strongest objection was that the 
pay for participation in research was held down to levels comparable to prison in-
dustries. 
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH INVOLVING PRISONERS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
35–36 (1976). See also Obasogie, supra note 18, at 49–57. 
 66 See ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at ix. 
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the IOM report—the issues of voluntariness, including the meaning of coer-
cion and undue influence in the prison setting, as well as detailed discus-
sions contrasting behavioral research from biomedical research.67 The point 
is not that the Committee did not read our background paper; the Committee 
does not seem to have read any of the fifteen background papers or the four 
staff papers and reports that were prepared for the National Commission on 
the subject of research involving prisoners.68 
One can conclude, as the National Commission did, that it is possi-
ble to do ethical research in prisons, without concluding either that empha-
sis on consent is ―myopic‖ (both the IOM and National Commission discus-
sions with prisoners actually support the opposite conclusion), or that we 
should approve of research simply because prisoners want it. Neither con-
clusion follows. Prisoners support informed consent as much as ethicists do; 
and what prisoners want most, including, and perhaps especially those at 
Guantánamo who have no release date, is not to be research subjects, or to 
be on a hunger strike, but to be out of prison.  
This suggests another vertigo-inducing problem in the IOM report 
(and at Guantánamo): the conclusion that we should focus more on ―justice‖ 
(the procedural task of weighing risks versus benefits) than ―consent‖ (the 
substantive rule of prisoner self-determination) in prison research. Commit-
tee member Jonathan Moreno wrote about this issue in a book cited by the 
Committee for this proposition.69 But the Committee’s incoherent emphasis 
on procedural ―cost/benefit justice‖70 in this context cannot be attributed to 
him. As Moreno concludes: 
Generalized discussions about justice are sorely limited concerning specif-
ic groups . . . . The respective situations of prisoners, institutionalized per-
sons, military personnel, and students are quite different and require ana-
lyses tailored to each of them. Underlying all these cases are complex is-
sues of social status and power as well as medical ethics.
71
 
  
 67 See generally G.J. Annas, L.H. Glantz & B.F. Katz, The Law of Informed Consent in 
Human Experimentation: Prisoners, in Research Involving Prisoners: Appendix to Report 
and Recommendations 7-1–7-60 (1976), in INFORMED CONSENT TO HUMAN 
EXPERIMENTATION: THE SUBJECT’S DILEMMA 1–55 (1977). 
 68 See generally ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17. 
 69 J.D. Moreno, Convenient and Captive Populations in J.P. KAHN, A.C. MASTROIANNI, J. 
SUGARMAN, BEYOND CONSENT: SEEKING JUSTICE IN RESEARCH 111–130 (New York: Oxford 
U. Press, 1998). 
 70 See ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at 65–66. Justice in the ―justice system‖ 
is primarily about how we got to the point where so many Americans are in prison in the first 
place; this issue is also critical at Guántanamo where fewer than ten percent of the prisoners 
there were captured by U.S. troops—instead, they were turned in by bounty hunters. 
 71 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at 126. 
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Moreno seems correct here, and these justice considerations are 
central to the Committee’s conclusion, that some studies would simply not 
be allowable under the Committee’s ―risk-benefit analysis.‖ Specifically, in 
the Committee’s words: 
The potential benefit of an experimental intervention must be established 
before engaging in a risk-benefit analysis. As such, phase l and phase 2 
studies, as defined by the FDA to determine safety and toxicity levels, 
would not be allowable. . .only phase 3 studies would be allowed [in pris-
ons].
72
 
This seems clear enough. Thus, it is at least surprising that in the 
very next chapter the most controversial example of a study that the Com-
mittee believes should be able to be done under its new ethical framework is 
―[a] phase l study of a medication [that] may reduce repetitive sexual as-
saults.‖73 The Committee at least realizes that this study would not be justi-
fiable under its risk-benefit framework, and so suggests it as an exception 
that is ―necessary as there are no alternative candidate research populations 
to draw from.‖74 But repetitive sexual assault is hardly a unique problem of 
prisoners, and the prison sample is skewed, representing as it does only 
those who got caught by the criminal justice system. In Moreno’s terms, 
such subjects seem to be mostly targeted because they are ―captive and con-
venient‖ rather than the most scientifically relevant. This again is consistent 
with the Guantánamo prisoners where actions taken against them are justi-
  
 72 Id. at 127. The committee seems to have convinced itself both that there are studies 
(other than studies of prison conditions and their effect on prisoners) that can only be done 
on prisoners, and that current regulations prohibit such studies. But nowhere in their report 
are either of these conclusions validated. With the possible exception of this phase one study 
and example nine (comparing two drugs for impulse control disorders), all of the other 
twelve examples described in chapter 6 are approvable under the current prison regulations. 
This leads readers to wonder exactly what the problem is that the committee’s recommenda-
tions, vague as they are, are designed to solve. 
 73 See ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at 167. The only specific comment on the 
National Commission’s own report occurs at pages 121 and 122 of the IOM report:  
The original commissioners [i.e. members of the National Commission] talked to 
actual prisoner-subjects during a fact finding visit to Jackson State Prison on No-
vember 14, 1975. The prison, in southern Michigan, was at the time home to one of 
the largest nontherapeutic biomedical research programs in the country . . . The 
commission members spoke with a representative sample of research participants 
and nonparticipants selected by commission staff from a master list of all prisoners 
and found that, overall, participants valued the opportunity to participate in re-
search and felt they were sufficiently informed and free to enroll and withdraw at 
will, and nonparticipants did not object to this opportunity being available to oth-
ers. 
See id. at 121–2. See also Obasogie, supra note 18, at 62–71 (describing the lack of empirical 
data in the IOM). 
 74 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS, supra note 17, at 167. 
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fied primarily because they are ―captive,‖ and the only effective way they 
have to protest their confinement is by going on a hunger strike. The ―jus-
tice‖ justification for force-feeding them is the military’s weighing of risks 
and benefits to their health of not eating; the justice of their confinement is 
never addressed. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
A contemporary report on the ethics of prisoner research, including 
―research‖ on breaking prison hunger strikes, has yet to be written. The 
IOM report will survive mostly as a relic of the Bush Administration be-
cause it identified no real problem to address, both expanded and contracted 
the definition of prisoners, ignored the context of the global war on terror 
and international law, and failed to develop either a consistent ethical 
framework or a draft of recommended changes in statutory or regulatory 
law. Nonetheless, it can help us understand what is happening at Guantána-
mo, and why it is accurate to see Guantánamo as a mirror of official U.S. 
prison policy and practice, not an exception or aberration. Dual use of phy-
sicians in prisons has a formidable pedigree in the United States, and the 
only ―solution‖ to it is for prison physicians to refuse to comply with any 
order or request from prison officials, including military commanders in 
charge of military prisons, that is inconsistent with medical ethics. Such 
orders should also be explicitly labeled ―unlawful‖ orders by the U.S. De-
partment of Defense. Military physicians should no more be expected to 
violate medical ethics than military lawyers should be expected to violate 
the U.S. Constitution, or than military chaplains should be expected to vi-
olate the tenets of their religions. Military physicians should not, however, 
be expected to do this alone; medical professional organizations, state li-
censing boards, and the public all have a stake in the medical profession and 
all should actively support physicians who take medical ethics seriously.  
This is one reason (patient health is another) why military and prison physi-
cians should be able to call in independent civilian medical consultants as 
they see fit. 
The IOM Committee was right to quote an observation usually at-
tributed to Dostoyevsky, although it is impossible to identify where the au-
thor actually wrote these words: ―The degree of civilization in a society can 
be judged by entering its prisons.‖ In the case of the United States, those 
prisons have names, including Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo. And our civi-
lization deserves to be judged by our fidelity to international human rights 
law and medical ethics practice as reflected in those prisons. We cannot 
credibly reform Guantánamo alone; we must reform our entire prison sys-
tem, especially our system of prison healthcare, of which Guantánamo is 
just a reflection. In commenting about his visit to Alcatraz, Levy could have 
been making an observation about Guantánamo and the Marine Corp brig 
holding Private Bradley Manning: ―No escapees from Alcatraz. Just the 
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damned of Alcatraz. And perhaps, beyond Alcatraz, a whole segment of the 
American penal system [modeled on the leper colony].‖75 
 
  
 75 Levy, supra note 9, at 167. 
